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Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System and Possible Responses 
Arvind Panagariya 
1. Introduction 
In addition to the obvious—that we both specialize in trade policy—there are two 
important similarities between the writings of Rolf Langhammer, whom we honor today, 
and my own.  We both have a deep interest in trade and trade policies as they relate to the 
welfare of the developing countries; and we both take a skeptical view of the 
discriminatory route to freeing up trade. The vast majority of our writings on trade 
liberalization are in the spirit of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle as enshrined 
in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  This view also predisposes us unfavorably towards myriad Free 
Trade Area (FTA) agreements with their complex rules of origin that have now created a 
virtual spaghetti bowl of tariffs, undermining the multilateral trading system.   
An outstanding contribution by Rolf  (Langhammer 2009) along these lines is his 
recent paper provocatively titled “Why a marketplace must not discriminate?”  In this 
paper, he systematically assesses virtually all aspects of the case for the Transatlantic 
Free Trade Area (TAFTA) and, arguing that it will involve far too much discrimination 
against third countries, comes out in favor of what he calls the Transatlantic Trade 
Liberalization Initiative (TALI) that would refrain from discrimination and will ‘facilitate 
global trade by multilateralizing rules for transaction procedures concluded between the 
EU and the US, and to extend these to third parties.’ (p. 20). 
While Rolf has written prolifically, contributing over 200 professional articles, 
since the multilateral trading system is directly or indirectly at the center of his work and 
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since the failure in bringing the Doha Round to a close to-date preoccupies trade 
economists today, this paper honors him by taking stock of where we stand today with 
respect to achieving the goal of free trade and what can be expected in the forthcoming 
years.  Given the fact that an important aspect of the current tensions and fissures in the 
trading system that have emerged relates to the substantial rise in the economic weight of 
the developing countries, this subject also brings into sharp focus Rolf’s longstanding 
interest in the developing countries. 
Many commentators are today pessimistic about the future of the multilateral 
trading system.  While the failure to bring the Doha round to conclusion after eleven 
years of its launch provides a substantive basis for this pessimism, the fear on the part of 
many that the multilateral trading system and the WTO are somehow in deep trouble is 
exaggerated.  Despite the current impasse, there is much to celebrate about the progress 
made to-date in achieving a liberal trading system and institutionalizing much though not 
all of it through the instrumentality of the WTO.  Moreover, Doha is not really dead—
certainly, none of the certified doctors has made such a pronouncement. 
2. The Good News: A Well-functioning and Liberal Trading World Today 
In the midst of the gloom surrounding the failure to bring the Doha negotiations to a 
conclusion, it is easy to forget that the multilateral trading system has had great success in 
the last two decades.  Just as many commentators have declared today that Doha Round 
is dead, Lester Thurow, an influential intellectual in his time in Democratic circles, had 
famously proclaimed at the Davos Symposium in 1988 that ‘GATT is dead.’  While 
Thurow had many sympathizers at the time, GATT not only survived, it also became the 
seed that seven years later flourished into the banyan tree we call the WTO today.  Rather 
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than the pessimism of Thurow, it was the optimism of Jagdish Bhagwati that prevailed.  
In his Harry Johnson lecture (Bhagwati 1990), the latter reminded that when the monarch 
dies, the British say, ‘The Queen is dead.  Long live the Queen.’ In a similar vein, he 
suggested, the appropriate response to Thurow would be: “The GATT is dead.  Long live 
the GATT.”  And that is exactly what happened.  The GATT as an institution came to an 
end with the WTO replacing it but the GATT as an agreement governing goods trade 
lives on.  
To give an idea of the far-reaching accomplishments during the past quarter century, I 
discuss below the developments in three areas: trade liberalization and growth in world 
trade, changed developing country attitudes towards trade and foreign investment, and 
the success of the WTO in implementing trade agreements.   
2.1. Trade Liberalization is Intact and World Trade is Flourishing 
World trade in goods and services is much freer today than in the pre-WTO world.  
Protection-motivated non-tariff barriers, which had plagued the system until as recently 
as the 1980s, are virtually gone.  Tariffs have also come significantly down with over 
protection to industrial products at historically lowest level in almost all countries.  Table 
1, which shows the latest average tariff rates on industrial products available for the 
major developed and developing countries, bears witness to this change.   
Developed countries have come to bind virtually all their tariffs while developing 
countries have also bound a substantial proportion of their tariff lines.  More importantly, 
applied tariffs have dropped to their lowest levels in the recent history.  Even in India, 
which is often depicted as a highly protected country, the simple average of applied 
industrial tariffs is 10.1 percent compared with 8.7 percent in China.  While the highest 
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average tariffs are concentrated in the countries in Latin America, even they are below 15 
percent.  In the developed countries, the simple average of tariffs is uniformly below 5 
percent. 
Table 1: Tariffs on non-agricultural products 
Binding 
coverage
Simple Average Duty Free Duties > 15% 
% Bound MFN Bound MFN Bound MFN 
Country Year of 
MFN 
   Share of HS 6-digit subheadings (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Canada  2010 99.7 5.3 2.6 36.1 72.8 7.1 6.7
United States  2010 100 3.3 3.3 47.6 47.6 2.4 2.4
Latin America         
Argentina  2010 100 31.8 12.9 0 14.2 98.2 39
Brazil 2010 100 30.7 14.2 0.7 5.2 96.5 40.4
Colombia  2010 100 35.4 11.8 0 2.8 100 25.7
Mexico  2010 100 34.9 7.1 0.3 50.2 99.2 9.5
Western Europe         
European Union  2010 100 3.9 4 28.4 26.7 0.9 0.9
Iceland  2010 94.2 9.6 2.3 46.3 76.7 27.8 0
Norway  2010 100 3.1 0.5 48.9 95.2 0 0
Switzerland  2010 99.7 2 1.9 17.8 18.8 1 0.9
Turkey  2010 42.7 17 4.8 4 25 20 3.1
Asia/Pacific         
Australia  2010 96.7 11 3 19.2 44.9 15.2 0
China  2010 100 9.2 8.7 6.5 7.7 13.4 11.6
India  2009 69.8 34.6 10.1 3.1 2.4 66.2 6.7
Indonesia  2010 95.1 35.5 6.6 2.8 23.8 88.7 1.8
Japan  2010 99.6 2.5 2.5 55.9 56.5 0.7 0.7
Korea, Republic of  2010 93.8 10.2 6.6 15.9 17.2 12.5 1.8
Source: WTO: World Tariff Profiles, 2011. 
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The proportion of applied tariff rates exceeding 15 percent is also generally low.  In Asia, 
this proportion is below 12 percent in all countries shown in Table 1.  Remarkably, at 6.7 
percent, this proportion in India is significantly below the 11.6 percent in China.  In the 
developed countries, the proportion is uniformly well below 3 percent with Canada being 
the major exception.  The highest concentration of tariff peaks is in Latin America.   
Table 2: Tariffs on agricultural products 
Simple 
Average 
Duty Free Duties > 15% Maximum duty
Bound MFN Bound MFN Bound MFN Bound MFN 
Country Year of 
MFN 
  % Share of HS 6-digit headings   
Developed          
Canada 2010 16.7 11.3 48.1 58.5 9.6 5.8 597 584 
United States 2010 4.8 4.9 32.8 30.5 5.8 5.4 350 350 
EU 2010 12.3 12.8 32.5 30 24.6 24.7 191 191 
Norway 2010 131.1 49.4 29 45.1 47.2 41 >1000 >1000
Switzerland 2010 48.2 27.2 22.9 28.6 41.4 25.9 >1000 >1000
Japan 2010 20.9 17.3 34.2 35.9 23.8 22.6 660 640 
Australia 2010 3.4 1.3 30.7 74.9 3.6 0.5 29 19 
Cairns Developing         
Argentina 2010 32.4 10.3 0.1 6.1 95.1 15.7 35 32 
Brazil 2010 35.4 10.3 2.7 6.3 95.7 15.4 55 28 
Colombia 2010 91.4 17.2 0 1.9 99.9 43 227 98 
Indonesia 2010 47.1 8.4 0 13.7 99.4 4.3 210 150 
Other Developing          
Mexico 2010 44.2 21.5 0.4 17.7 95 43.4 254 254 
Turkey 2010 60.7 43.4 0 16.4 87.1 62.7 225 225 
China 2010 15.7 15.6 6 5.9 35.4 34.6 65 65 
India 2009 113.1 31.8 0 5.6 98.6 82.4 300 150 
Korea, Rep. of 2010 55.9 48.5 2.2 5.4 73 51.4 887 887 
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Source: WTO: World Tariff Profiles, 2011 
Although agriculture is protected at a far higher level, as shown in table 2, progress in 
liberalizing this sector has been among the most important developments in recent years.  
For decades, this sector had remained effectively outside the GATT discipline.  But the 
Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement has now brought it under multilateral discipline with 
some progress made towards its liberalization as well.  Later, I will argue that the Doha 
negotiations have perhaps been partially a victim of the success achieved in liberalizing 
this sector since the launch of the round, especially in bringing down domestic and export 
subsidies. 
Finally, the transformation in both the attitude and actual trade policy towards 
services trade has been most remarkable.  When the Uruguay Round was launched, 
developing countries were so skeptical of negotiations in this area that they insisted on 
keeping it out of the single undertaking so that services trade agenda was relegated to a 
separate track from the rest.  Yet, when the negotiations heated up, it was intellectual 
property rights (IPR) issues that generated the greatest opposition from the developing 
countries with services brought centrally under the multilateral discipline through the 
General Agreement on Trade In Services (GATS) with relative ease.  Indeed, today, most 
developing countries actively seek foreign investment in services and have gone on to 
liberalize trade in this area through national policy reform to a far greater extent than they 
committed under GATS negotiations.  With rare exceptions, both India and China have 
opened virtually all sectors to foreign investors, with the larger developing countries in 
Latin America doing the same as well. 
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Trade outcomes have mirrored this liberalization, with goods as well as services trade 
expanding at accelerated pace.  The simple average of annual growth rates of world 
merchandise exports rose from 5.6 percent during 1981-94 to 8.9 percent during 1995-
10.1  These growth rates compare to 2.2 percent annual growth in the world GDP during 
both periods. 
 
Figure 1: Merchandise exports from the major regions of the world, 2000-10 
Source: Based on data in International Trade Statistics 2011, Geneva: World Trade 
Organization. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the trajectories of merchandise and commercial services exports 
(in current dollars) of the major regions of the world from 2000 to 2010.  Merchandise 
                                                 
1 These rates have been calculated using the annual growth rates , appendix table A1 in International Trade 
Statistics 2011, Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
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exports have shown remarkable growth in the three major regions of the world: Europe, 
North America and Asia.  In Europe, they have more than doubled and in Asia, they have 
almost tripled during the decade.  Growth in North America has been slower but still 
impressive with exports rising from $1225 billion in 2000 to $1965 billion in 2010.  
Remarkably, though much smaller in magnitude, exports in the remaining three 
regions—Africa, Middle East and Commonwealth of Independent States—has been as 
impressive as in Asia.  In each case, merchandise exports have more than tripled during 
the decade. 
  
Figure 2: Exports of commercial services from the major regions of the world, 2000-10 
Source: Based on data in International Trade Statistics 2011, Geneva: World Trade 
Organization. 
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Growth in the exports of commercial services has been similarly spectacular.  In 
North America, they have almost doubled; in Europe, they have more than doubled; and 
In Asia, they have more than tripled between 2000 and 2010.  The remaining three 
regions have also seen their commercial services exports nearly or more than tripled.  
From the viewpoint of facilitating trade, the WTO has been a huge success.  
2.2. Developing Countries have Embraced Freer Trade and Investment 
The last two decades have also seen a serious shift in the attitudes of developing 
countries towards international trade.  Rather than viewing foreign competition as threat 
to their industries they now see an opportunity in it.  Though reluctant in the 1980s when 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank aggressively pushed trade 
liberalization, they have progressively come to embrace it in the past two decades.  
Indeed, in what Bhagwati has called an “ironic reversal,” today, it is the developed 
countries that express fear of foreign competition, with the rhetoric of job losses abroad 
and leveling of unskilled wages in the face of competition from the developing countries 
becoming louder and louder. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, development thinking was dominated by the view that 
developing countries needed to foster industrialization and that this required protection to 
manufacturing against competition from well-established foreign suppliers.  Reliance on 
exports was seen as a non-starter because it as thought that the demand for developing 
country exports, which consisted of largely primary products, exhibited low elasticity 
with respect to both price and income and.  Low price elasticity meant that any efforts by 
the developing countries to expand exports would be frustrated by such large endogenous 
decline in the terms of trade that expanded exports would end up fetching reduced 
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revenues.  And he low income elasticity meant that over time, as incomes rose in the 
industrial countries, their demand would shift in favor of manufactures and services and 
away from developing country exports with the result that the developing countries will 
experience a an exogenous secular decline in their terms of trade. 
This line of thinking inevitably led the developing countries to seek special and 
differential treatment in framing the rules of international trade under the auspices of 
GATT.  That in turn translated into developing countries having a free hand in the use of 
all instruments of protection including strict licensing and high tariffs as well as one-way 
trade preferences involving better than the MFN access to their products in the developed 
country markets.  Import substitution remained the name of the game until the late 1970s 
except in the four Asian tiger economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. 
By the late 1960s, evidence from South Korea and Taiwan had begun to convince at 
least some economists that outward orientation offered a superior road to 
industrialization.  This was the theme of two large-scale, multi-volume studies carried out 
in the 1970s under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) under the directorship of Little, 
Scitovsky and Scott (1970), and Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978), respectively.  
These studies greatly influenced the thinking at the World Bank and the International 
monetary Fund (IMF), which in turn used the instrumentality of loan conditionality 
during the 1980s to push trade liberalization and other pro-market reforms in the 
developing countries. 
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While the developing countries saw much of the liberalization under the Bank-Fund 
conditionality as having been imposed on them from outside under duress and remained 
reluctant players for liberalization during the UR negotiations, interactions involved in 
Bank-Fund programs and resulting experimentation perhaps led them to think harder 
about alternative policy choices.  More importantly, their attitudes began to shift in a 
major way after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the success 
story of China under an outward-oriented regime.  These developments and a recognition 
that the autarkic policies and domestic controls had not delivered led India, which had 
been a bastion of protection, to turn to liberal policies in 1991.  Its post-reform success 
and continued rise of China helped change the developing country attitudes yet further. 
 While developing countries today continue to demand special and differential 
treatment, they participate much more actively in the negotiations.  The emergence of the 
G-20 grouping prior to the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting and its success in getting the 
developed countries to drop three of the four Singapore issues from the Doha negotiating 
agenda offer one example of their engagement with the negotiating process.  They 
continued to play the same active role subsequently at Hong Kong ministerial meeting 
and then in the 2008 negotiations in Geneva that produced a deadlock between developed 
and developing countries. 
 Developing countries have also come to use the dispute settlement body (DSB) to 
defend their trade interests.  Hoekman (2012), who makes this point cogently, points out 
that while developing countries were defendants in only 8 percent of the cases under the 
GATT, under the WTO, they have been defendants in 35 percent of the cases.2  
                                                 
2 This paragraph is based on Hoekman (2012). 
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Developing countries have also emerged as complainants, accounting for one-third of all 
cases brought to DSB during 1995-11.  Even more interestingly, as many as 44 percent of 
the developing country cases have been against other developing countries.  In a highly 
visible case, India challenged the EU GSP plus program in 2003 with adverse 
implications for the neighboring Pakistan who benefited from the program.  In another 
similar case, Brazil challenged the EU export subsidy on sugar that had benefited the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries through guaranteed access to the highly 
protected EU market.   
 Finally, it needs to be emphasized that while all developing countries can be said 
to have moved away from anti-trade policies of the 1950s and 1960s, vast differences 
among them remain.  At one extreme, we have the least developed countries (LDCs) that 
still insist on and enjoy one-way trade preferences.  They have tariff-free access to the 
internal EU market under “everything but arms” (EBA) initiative.  Developing countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, vast majority of them also LDCs, enjoy significant one-way 
preferences in the United States market under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.  
At the other extreme, larger developing countries such as China, Brazil, India and 
Indonesia have become vocal demanders of concessions in the negotiations.  Cairns 
Group developing countries including Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia and Colombia had, of 
course, played an important role in bringing agriculture into the negotiations even under 
the Uruguay Round. 
2.3. WTO as an Institution is Intact     
A key function of the WTO is to implement the existing agreements among member 
countries.  When the WTO replaced GATT on January 1, 1995, it greatly expanded 
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multilateral discipline on trade.  It brought textiles, agriculture and services into the fold 
of multilateral rules.  It also entered new territory by creating a uniform intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) regime in all areas of intellectual property.   And it replaced the 
relatively weak dispute settlement system in which implementation of the rulings of 
GATT panels was largely dependent on the goodwill of the offender by a binding system 
backed by the right to retaliate on the part of the damaged party in case of non-
compliance by the offending party. 
In a recent paper, Davey (2012) assesses the performance of the WTO in 
implementing the existing agreements and settling disputes.  I largely agree with his 
conclusion that the institution has been broadly successful in both these areas.  
Implementation involves ensuring that member countries file various notifications on 
trade laws such as those relating to dumping laws to patent laws and regulations affecting 
trade such as those spelling out TBT [Technical barriers to Trade] and SPS [Sanitary and 
Phyto-sanitary] measures.  The relevant committees have even helped informally helped 
identify best practices in these areas. 
 With respect to dispute settlement, it had been feared that this function will be 
usurped by dispute settlement mechanisms in myriad FTAs but William Davey (2012) 
argues that this has not happened.  In his view, this is because WTO dispute settlement 
system has certain advantages over FTA dispute settlement systems.  “The FTA systems 
tend to have binational panels without possibility of appeal and with no Secretariat 
support, thus there are more frequent concerns with bias and quality of decisions. While 
WTO system is multilateral, FTAs are often composed of two or only a few parties. This 
means that power plays a much more important role in the implementation of results. 
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There is peer pressure to implement DSB decisions in the WTO, there is nothing 
comparable in an FTA, particularly where some of the parties have unequal bargaining 
power.” (Davey, 2012, p. 10) 
Davey (2012) also discusses in detail the functioning of WTO dispute settlement and 
concludes that despite some shortcomings, it has lived up to expectation.  First, after an 
initial surge, the number of cases brought for consultations has been cut to half of their 
level in the 1990s.  The number of cases has been reasonably steady during the 2000s 
suggesting that a steady state may have been reached.  Second, while some cases have 
experienced delays with panels taking longer than stipulated, these have been few.  The 
appellate body had given its verdict within the stipulated 90-day limit except in the last 
two years with these delays arising out of the two massive subsidy cases involving Airbus 
and Boeing.  Third, rulings in almost all cases have been implemented though in only 
about half of the cases this has taken place within reasonable time.  In some cases, 
implementation has taken quite long but implementation has taken place in all cases.  
Finally, developing countries in general and smaller countries in particular have been 
able to access to the system and use it effectively to protect their trading rights. 
 A final point worth making is that despite the major financial crisis, which created 
prolonged high levels of unemployment in the major industrial economies that continue 
till today, trade disruption has been minimal.  No doubt, violations of WTO rules took 
place in most countries but when seen against the dislocation the crisis created, these 
were hardly serious and resulted in few WTO challenges by the damaged parties.  This 
was in contrast to the Great Depression when similar dislocations led to a virtual trade 
war between Europe and the United States that led to the enactment of the infamous 
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Smoot-Hawley tariffs in the latter.  On the whole, trade has recovered relatively quickly 
in the aftermath of the crisis, as evidenced by Figures 1 and 2. 
3. The Bad News: The Failure to Close Doha Carries a Very High Cost 
It is tempting to argue that given that world trade a freer today than ever before, that 
the key WTO members are happy with where they are in terms of market access (see 
below), and that the WTO has reached a stage at which it could continue to implement 
the existing agreements and settle disputes as they arise, declaring an end to Doha 
negotiations and eschewing future multilateral negotiations is a perfectly acceptable 
outcome.  But such an inference represents a serious error of judgment. 
As Bhagwati (2012) has pointed out, in addition to the obvious that the benefits that 
would have accrued from trade liberalization and trade-friendly reform of rules will not 
materialize, the failure to complete the Doha round has at three other costs: future 
multilateral liberalization will come to a halt for years o come; multilateral rule-making 
will be greatly undermined; and WTO authority to settle dispute settlement will be 
undermined. 
The end to multilateral negotiations will leave preferential trade area (PTA) 
agreements as the only game in town.  Because the level of protection was extremely 
high at the time the GATT was signed, despite vast amount of liberalization over the 
decades, the world still remains very far from global free trade.  As such, the benefits 
from further multilateral liberalization can hardly be discounted.  The Doha failure, 
which will leave al future trade liberalization to PTAs, would leave little incentive for 
Brazil, China and India to open their markets to the United States.  Given the current 
United States FTA template, which necessarily requires labor WTO plus environmental 
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and intellectual property clauses, it is implausible that these countries will enter into 
PTAs with it.  Likewise, it is doubtful that any remaining barriers in the United States and 
EU could be or should be eliminated through a bilateral agreement between them.  Given 
the current trends and future expectations, Brazil, China and India together will be larger 
than the United States in twenty-five years.  Even the possibility that the United States, 
Europe and emerging market economies including Brazil, China and India, with each 
accounting for one-fifth or more of the world economy, will maintain high protection 
against one another is something to worry about. The world needs multilateral 
negotiations to succeed to maintain the momentum for trade liberalization. 
But WTO negotiations involve not just trade liberalization but also rule making.  
Even if one subscribes to the hard-to-defend extreme view that multilateral negotiations 
for trade liberalization among as many as 156 members consisting of powerful countries 
whose interests diverge too much to allow progress and therefore it is best to leave 
liberalization to PTAs, we need multilateral negotiations to arrive at new rules and reform 
the old ones.  While we may debate, as we have done for at least two decades, whether 
bilateral and multilateral routes are complementary or in conflict with one another with 
respect to the objective of worldwide free trade but we cannot debate it with respect to 
reaching rules that are globally efficient.  Rules negotiated bilaterally will necessarily 
disregard the effects on the third countries.  For example, TBT and SPS measures in 
bilateral arrangements run the clear risk of being used as devices to keep third countries 
out of the market. 
There is also added risk that when disputes arise in areas in which multilateral rules 
are either unclear or nonexistent, decisions by WTO panels and appellate body will 
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effectively end up making rules.  The most obvious example here concerns carbon taxes.  
The existing rules in this area are sufficiently unclear to allow multiple interpretations.  
And given the current political atmosphere and pressures, it is likely that a future panel 
might feel compelled to rule such taxes WTO legal.  That would de facto establish a new 
rule to which that the member countries did not actually agree.  Similar possibilities exist 
in the area of labor standards and intellectual property. 
Finally, as Bhagwati (2012) forcefully points out, once the multilateral process is 
weakened, dispute settlement itself may move to bilateral processes.  To quote him, “The 
DSM [dispute settlement mechanism] is the pride of the WTO: it is the only impartial and 
binding mechanism for adjudicating and enforcing contractual obligations defined by the 
WTO and accepted by its members. It gives every member, big or small, a platform and a 
voice.”  He goes on, “Once PTA-based DSMs are established, however, adjudication of 
disputes will reflect asymmetries of power, benefiting the stronger trade partner. 
Moreover, third countries will have little scope for input into PTA-based DSMs, though 
their interests may very well be affected by how adjudication is structured.” 
Before concluding this section, it may be noted that some of the academic literature, 
most notably, Rose (2002), has advanced the view that somehow the WTO is irrelevant to 
the expansion of trade.  The conclusion is derived by answering the question whether the 
entry of a country into the WTO leads to an expansion of its trade in the negative.  But to 
those familiar with the history of GATT and WTO, a moment’s consideration should 
convince that this is the wrong way to phrase the question.  Even though the most favored 
nation (MFN) provision of the GATT prohibits discrimination only against other 
members, with rare exceptions, member countries have extended the trade liberalization 
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negotiated under the GATT and WTO to non-members.  Thus, for example, even though 
South Korea was outside GATT in 1965, it benefited from the Kennedy Round 
liberalization.  Similarly, though China did not enter the WTO until 2001, it benefited 
from all seven negotiating rounds under the GATT including the Uruguay Round.  The 
same also goes for Russia most recently.  Often countries choose to enter to preserve the 
benefits they are already enjoying.  No wonder then that the entry itself shows up as a 
non-event in Ross-type regression analysis. 
In addition, it bears reiterating in this context that the WTO is not just about trade 
liberalization but also rules and settlement of disputes.  It is inconceivable that the order 
in the trading system and consequent expansion of the world trade we have observed in 
the last six decades could have materialized in the absence of the WTO.  By implication, 
the preservation of the institution and all its current strengths is essential.  And for that, 
the eventual conclusion of a Doha agreement remains crucial. 
To search for possible solutions, we must first turn to a discussion of what factors 
have contributed to the current impasse, a subject a consider next.  
4. Challenges to The Multilateral Trading System 
At the outset, it may be pointed out that the common impression that the WTO has no 
achievements to its credit in the area of new negotiations is false.  The Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA), which brought all tariffs on information technology 
products in the signatory countries to zero, was inked soon after the WTO came into 
existence.  Soon after, agreements were also reached on two services issues: telecom and 
financial services.  Declaration to kick off the wide-ranging Doha Development Round 
was reached in 2001 alongside the Doha Declaration on the TRPS Agreement and Public 
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Health.  The latter was followed up by the decision for the Amendment of The TRIPS 
Agreement in December 2005 though its ratification is yet to be completed.  These were 
contentious issues at one time and constitute significant achievements.  But it is often the 
case that once a negotiation is successfully concluded, no matter how contentious it may 
have been initially, it diminishes in significance.  
These achievements have, however, been marred by what is definitely a bigger failure 
of bringing the Doha negotiations to a conclusion.  Even excluding the last four years, 
which have been largely devoid of any significant activity to advance the negotiations, 
there has been seven years of intense efforts have not produced an agreement.  
Considerably progress had been achieved during the last serious effort in July 2008 but 
given the all or nothing nature of the outcome, no concrete progress has taken place.  
With rare exceptions, observers have come to feel that the round has reached an impasse 
that cannot be broken, with some going so far as to suggest that it should now be 
officially killed.  The silver lining for the optimists, however, is that while the 
negotiations remain in intensive care on life support, virtually none of the major 
negotiators has suggested that the life supports be withdrawn.  Therefore, the hope that 
something may still be rescued remains alive. 
A key question is why the Doha negotiations have reached the impasse.  Many 
explanations are provided though one can take issue with each. 
4.1. False Claims Leading to Unrealistic Expectations 
The labeling of the negotiations as “development round” created the expectations on 
the part of most developing countries that the UR round had effectively damaged them 
and the new round would be about correcting that injustice.  This impression was greatly 
 20
reinforced by repeated subsequent assertions by the heads of international institutions, 
press, NGOs and many influential academics to the effect that agricultural protection is 
largely a developed country problem; developed-country subsidies and protection hurt the 
poorest developing countries the most; it is wrong to ask the poor countries to liberalize 
when rich countries heavily protect their own markets; and agricultural subsidies and 
protection in the rich countries reflect double standard and hypocrisy on the part of the 
rich countries.  In addition, respectable institutions such as the OECD gave an 
exaggerated impression of developed countries subsides by producing measures of 
subsidies such as the Producer Support Estimate in which it included the protection 
provided by trade barriers into it.  I have documented these exaggerations and falsehoods 
systematically in Panagariya (2005a, 2005b) and need not repeat the details here.  The 
effect of these assertions was to considerably harden the stance of the developing 
countries and to give them false hope that they deserved to get one-way concessions on 
agriculture from the developed countries.  But eventually, the developed countries came 
to demand agricultural liberalization from the developing countries as well that countries 
such as India and China then found politically difficult and contributed to the impasse. 
4.2. Doha a Victim of its Own Success  
It may be recalled that the language on liberalization of agricultural subsides had been 
the most contentious subject in the launch of the Doha negotiations.  The eventual 
language in the Doha Declaration included reductions in export subsidies “with a view to 
phasing [them] out.”  Disagreements on this language between the European union and 
India had contributed to the delay in the signing of the declaration at Doha by one full 
day. 
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Yet, today, agricultural export subsidies have nearly disappeared and actionable 
domestic agricultural subsides have come considerably down in both the European Union 
and United States.  Figure 3 shows that the export subsides in the European Union (EU) 
declined sharply between 2003-04 and 2007-08.  As of February 2011, export subsidies 
in the EU continued to be available for cereals, beef and veal, poultry meat, pig meat, 
eggs, sugar, and some processed goods but they had not been used on cereals since July 
2006 or on sugar since October 2008.  In the United States, export subsidies are down to 
tens of millions of dollars.   
    
Figure 3: Export Subsidies in the European Union, 2003-04 and 2007-08 (Reproduced from 
Trade Policy Review of EU, 2011 (WTO: WT/TPR/S/248, p. 211)  
Actionable domestic subsidies have similarly declined. As a result of reforms of the 






















as measured by the current total AMS [Aggregate Measure of Support], has either 
declined sharply or ceased altogether.  Support for cereals, dairy, and sugar remains more 
significant but the overall support has seen considerable decline.  Figure 4 show the 
change in Green, Amber and Red box subsidies in the EU between 2000-01 and 2007-08.  
In 2007-08, Amber Box subsidies had dropped to 12.4 billion euros.  Similarly, in the 
United States, the total support in 2007 was US$84.65 billion, of which 
US$76.2 billion was under the Green Box.  The AMS was down to $6.3 billion. 
Figure 4: Domestic Subsidies in EU, 200-01 to 2007-08. 
Symmetrically, markets in industrial goods and services in the developing countries 
have also undergone significant liberalization in the 2000s.  This is particularly true of 
two major countries: China and India.  As a part of it’s the conditions of its 2001 WTO 
entry, China undertook major obligations to liberalize.  It not only undertook this 
liberalization de fact but also bound it at the WTO giving it international legal force.  
India continued to bring its tariffs down and open services sectors to direct foreign 
investment until at least 2004-05 as a part of its national liberalization.  As a result, 
outside of agriculture, which remains highly protected, it has a very open trade regime 
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with the trade in goods and services as a proportion of the GDP rising to above 50 
percent.   These developments have perhaps left the major players more or less satisfied 
in terms of market access while lacking the appetite for further opening of their own 
markets that would be necessary to bring the Doha round to a conclusion.  They are 
perhaps afraid to disturb the domestic political equilibrium for what would essentially 
amount to nothing more than binding of the existing liberalization by partner countries. 
4.3. Preferential Trade Areas (PTAs) 
I have argued ever since PTAs began gathering momentum they were an unfortunate 
development and they posed a threat to multilateral liberalization.3  The opponents 
argued that PTAs were GATT plus or WTO plus and they would complement rather than 
supplant multilateral liberalization.  It is now clear, that PTAs have become a major 
stumbling block to multilateral liberalization.  Export interests, especially in the 
developed countries, have learned that they get better deals through PTAs since they gain 
an upper hand over non-members within the union.  Therefore, they prefer bilateral rather 
than multilateral route to liberalization.  This is even truer of developed country lobbies 
pushing non-trade agenda consisting of intellectual property rights and labor standards.  
Large developing countries such as India, China and Brazil are strictly opposed to further 
proliferation of non-trade issues in the WTO, which they see as a trade institution.  That 
naturally diverts the lobbies to PTAs where they face much weaker developing country 
partners and have a relatively free play.  That game is being played almost entirely as 
Bhagwati (1994) had predicted.  He had hypothesized that that a hegemonic power is 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Panagariya (1996, 1999a, 2004), Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and the collection of 
my essays on regionalism, Panagariya (1999b).  Krishna (2012) offers a more recent critical assessment of 
the subject.  
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likely to gain a greater payoff by bargaining sequentially with a group of non-hegemonic 
powers than simultaneously.  In particular, he cited provisions with respect to intellectual 
property protection and environmental and labor standards as extra benefits secured by the 
United States through the uneven bargain in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). 
Keeping away from multilateral negotiations also allows countries to maintain many 
distortions in agriculture.  As an example, absent their consideration in multilateral 
negotiations, the United States cotton subsidies can continue indefinitely.  Buyers of 
cotton such as Bangladesh use cotton in apparel that they export and are happy to buy it 
for lower prices that subsidies imply.  A the same time, other cotton exporters such as the 
small West African countries and India cannot challenge the subsidies in the WTO. 
 In the United States, the pursuit of PTAs has also created a political problem that 
has spilled over to Doha negotiations.  PTAs require Congressional approval and since 
they are negotiated individually and sequentially, there is repeated acrimonious debate on 
free trade.  The result has been polarization resulting in a loss of appetite to push the 
Doha round.  
4.4. Emergence of Large Developing Country Players 
The post-UR world has seen the emergence of several large developing countries—
Brazil, China, India and Indonesia—that are expected to grow yet larger in relatively 
short period of time.  As it happens, despite considerable liberalization by these countries, 
especially China and India, the level of protection in them remains significantly higher 
than in the developed countries.  This asymmetry, complemented by the expectation of a 
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very large potential market in these emerging market economies, has given rise to 
difficulties in bargaining not previously experienced. 
In particular, seeing the large developed country markets, developed countries insist 
on average reciprocity meaning they want the developing countries to open their markets 
as much as their own.  But the developing countries seek marginal or the first-difference 
reciprocity whereby they are willing to offer only as much additional market access as 
they expect to receive from the developed countries in Doha negotiations.   
The situation is further complicated by the fact that China, which has the larges 
developing country market today, had to give very substantial concessions for its entry 
into the WTO in 2001.  On the one hand, it remains resentful that it had to give WTO 
plus concessions to gain the entry and on the other it feels that having completed the 
implementation of liberalizing measured agreed as a part of the entry conditions in the 
mid 2000s and not having had any role in shaping the Doha agenda, it lacks the room for 
additional large-scale liberalization.    
4.5. A Lack of Leadership 
Not to be underestimated is the role the lack of leadership in advancing the Doha 
round, especially in the United States, has played.  A deal had been nearly reached in July 
2008 when, pushed by its manufacturing lobby, Susan Schwab, the then United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), pulled the plug on the negotiation.  While the agreement 
on the formula (including the values of the coefficients in it) for liberalization in the area 
of non-agricultural-market access (NAMA) had been reached, the USTR reopened the 
issue by insisting in addition that participation in zero-for-zero tariffs in certain sectors be 
mandatory for the larger developing countries.  That insistence proved the deal-breaker. 
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Subsequently, President Barack Obama and his USTR have shown no interest 
whatsoever in advancing the Doha negotiations.  Indeed, the president has hardly 
mentioned the word “Doha” during his entire presidency though he has gone on to 
complete at least two free trade agreements, one with South Korea and the other with 
Colombia.  The refrain of lower-level officials in the administration has been that China, 
which now has the largest share in the world market for manufactures, should lead the 
process. 
5. What are the Solutions? 
At the outset, it must be recognized that no progress is likely without the United 
States having the will to lead.  This may not be sufficient to make progress but it is 
necessary.  Other alternatives, EU and China, are not credible.  The EU is represented as 
a single member in the WTO but is hardly united enough to lead and has, indeed, never 
done it.  As regards China, it still lacks the clout and legitimacy to lead the round; it is a 
stretch to think that the United States and EU will follow China’s lead.  There is no go on 
the negotiations without the United States President leading the charge. 
Assuming such leadership will be forthcoming in the future, a good starting point will 
be to conclude a minimalist agreement and bring a least a formal closure to the Doha 
round.  Such an agreement could be built around the progress towards an agreement that 
had been achieved in July 2008.  It should be understood that liberalization in this round 
for the developing countries will mean binding industrial tariffs at levels below the past 
bindings but still above their MFN tariffs while that for the developed countries will 
mean binding subsidies below the past bindings but above the current applied levels.  It is 
far too ambitious for the developed countries to demand bindings below the MFN levels 
 27
in most developing countries and for the developing countries to expect developed 
countries to bring bindings on subsidies below their current applied levels.  Some issues 
that had remained unresolved in July 2008 will require flexibility on all sides.  Cairns 
Groups of developing countries, which stand to benefit from agricultural liberalization 
and still have high tariffs (for example, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia), can surely give 
some added concessions in industrial goods and the developed countries could show 
grater flexibility on liberalization in agriculture.  Developing countries, most notably 
India, could redesign the special safeguard they have sought in agriculture such that it is 
invoked only when there is real threat of injury and not to role back liberalization. 
Short of a deal along these lines, the next best option, as suggested by many including 
Davey (2012), is an even more limited deal that involves stand-alone agreements on some 
of the least controversial subjects in the Doha agenda.  These may include such issues as 
trade facilitation, dispute settlement and fisheries subsidies.  While this fallback option is 
likely to be seen as a failure of the Doha round, it would still have the advantage of 
keeping the door to future negotiations open. 
Abandonment of both these options and a decision to declare the round as 
inconclusive will inevitably leave PTAs and plurilateral agreements such as the 
government procurement agreement as the only game in town.  That will without doubt 
greatly damage the multilateral trading system.  It is unlikely that such a process will 
promote genuine free trade.  For instance, it is inconceivable that the Transpacific 
Partnership (TPP), promoted by the United States as a way to advance freer trade, will be 
embraced by such major developing countries as China, India and Brazil.  Instead, these 
countries, especially China and India, are bound to pursue their own PTAs that exclude 
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the United States and EU.  These developments will fragment rather than unify the world 
economy. Equally, the process will produce even worse outcome in the area of rule 
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